;Chapters in collective books

  1. Metacognition. (forthcoming). In: T. Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Pdf 
  2. Non-human Metacognition. (forthcoming), in: J. Beck and C. Andrews (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds. Pdf 
  3. Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. (forthcoming), in J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (eds.),  Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pdf
  4.  On believing without a language, in: Frauchiger, M. (ed.), (2014).  Modalities, Identity, and Moral Dilemmas: Themes from Barcan Marcus, Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy, vol. 3, Berlin, Boston, Peking: Walter de Gruyter. pdf
  5. Metacognition and mindreading: one or two functions?  in: M. Beran, J. Brandl, J. Perner & J. Proust (Eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2012), 234-251.
  6.  Amelioration Cognitive  in G. Hottois & J.-N. Missa (Eds). L’Humain et ses préfixes : une encyclopédie de l’humanisme, du transhumanisme et du posthumanisme. Paris: Vrin (2012)).   
  7. Mental Acts as Natural Kinds, in: T. Vierkant, A. Clark, J. Kieverstein (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press (in press, 2012).
  8. Régulation langagière et application des formes, in A. Soulez, (ed.), La pensée de Gilles Granger. Paris: Hermann, 2010.
  9. Mental Acts  in: T. O’Connor & C. Sandis (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 209-217.
  10. Is there a sense of agency for thought? in L. O’Brien & M. Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions, Oxford, Oxford University Press,  2009, 253-279.
  11. What is a mental function? In A. Brenner & J. Gayon (dirs.), French Philosophy of Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer. 2009, vol. 276, 227-253.
  12. Adaptive control loops as an intermediate reduction basis, in A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction and Elimination, München: Ontos Verlag, 2009, 191-219.
  13. My answers to five questions on agency, in Jesús Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions, Automatic Press/VIP
  14. The Representational Basis of Brute Metacognition: A Proposal, in: Lurz, ed., Philosophy of Animal Minds: New Essays on Animal Thought and Consciousness, Cambridge University Press: 2009, 165-183.
  15. (avec E. Pacherie), Neurosciences et compréhension d’autrui, in L. Faucher et P. Poirier (dirs.) Philosophie et neurosciences. Syllepse, 2008, 295-328.
  16. Metacognition in conversation, in  I. Wachmuth & G. Knoblich, (dirs.), Embodied communication,  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008, 329-356. Proust.Embmeta – copie
  17. Agency in schizophrenics from a control theory viewpoint, in W. Prinz & N. Sebanz (eds.), Disorders of volition, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2006, 87-118.
  18. Rationality and metacognition in non-human animals, in S. Hurley & M. Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals ?, Oxford, Oxford University Press., 2006, 247-274.
  19. How voluntary are minimal actions? in S. Maasen, W. Prinz, J. Roth, Voluntary action, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 202-219.
  20. Perceiving intentions, in J. Roessler & N.Eilan (eds.), Agency and self-awareness: issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 296-320.
  21. Action, in B. Smith (ed.), John Searle, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 102-127.
  22. Can radical theories of simulation explain mental concept acquisition? in J. Dokic & J. Proust (eds), Simulation and Knowledge of action, Paris, Ecole Polytechnique, Bibliothèque du CREA, 2000, 387-435 ; traduction roumaine in G.G. Constandache (dir.); Filosofie si stiinte cognitive, Bucarest, Matric Rom, 158-175 version révisée publiée en (2002), in J. Dokic, & J. Proust, (eds.), Simulation and knowledge of action, Amsterdam : John Benjamins, 201-228.
  23. Imitation et agentivité, in J. Nadel & J.Decety, Imiter pour découvrir l’humain, Paris, PUF, 2002, 189-216.
  24. Are empirical arguments acceptable in philosophical analyses of the mind? in U. Moulines et K.G. Niebergall (dirs.), Argument & Analyse, Paderborn, Mentis, 2002, 163-186.
  25. Awareness of Agency: Three Levels of Analysis, (2000), in T. Metzinger (ed.), The Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Cambridge, MIT Press, 307-324.
  26. L’espace, les sens et l’objectivité, in Perception et intermodalité, approches actuelles de la question de Molyneux, (dir. J. Proust ), Paris, PUF, 1997, pp.125-159.
  27. Functionalism and multirealizability: On interaction between structure and function, in Science, Mind and Art, K. Gavroglu, J. Stachel & M. W. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 165, Kluwer, 1995, 169-185.

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