;Chapters in collective books


  1. Proust, J. (2018). La métacognition et l’auto-évaluation. in O. Houdé & g. Borst (eds.). Le cerveau et les apprentissages, pp. 207-228. Paris : Nathan. Pdf
  2. Metacognition. . In: T. Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 2018.  Pdf 
  3. with Martin Fortier: Metacognitive Diversity across Culture — Introduction in: J. Proust & M. Fortier, eds. Metacognitive Diversity: Interdisciplinary approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pdf
  4. Kim, S.,  Shahaeian, A. &  Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in Mindreading and Metacognition. in: J. Proust & M. Fortier, eds.: Metacognitive Diversity: Interdisciplinary approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press. PDF
  5. Non-human Metacognition. (2017), in: C. Andrews & J.Beck (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, pp. 142-153Pdf 
  6. Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. (2018), in J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. p. 132-154Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pdf
  7.  On believing without a language, in: Frauchiger, M. (ed.), (2014).  Modalities, Identity, and Moral Dilemmas: Themes from Barcan Marcus, Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy, vol. 3, Berlin, Boston, Peking: Walter de Gruyter. pdf
  8. Metacognition and mindreading: one or two functions?  in: M. Beran, J. Brandl, J. Perner & J. Proust (Eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2012), 234-251.
  9.  Amelioration Cognitive  in G. Hottois & J.-N. Missa (Eds). L’Humain et ses préfixes : une encyclopédie de l’humanisme, du transhumanisme et du posthumanisme. Paris: Vrin (2012)).   
  10. Mental Acts as Natural Kinds, in: T. Vierkant, A. Clark, J. Kieverstein (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press (in press, 2012).
  11. Régulation langagière et application des formes, in A. Soulez, (ed.), La pensée de Gilles Granger. Paris: Hermann, 2010.
  12. Mental Acts  in: T. O’Connor & C. Sandis (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 209-217.
  13. Is there a sense of agency for thought? in L. O’Brien & M. Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions, Oxford, Oxford University Press,  2009, 253-279.
  14. What is a mental function? In A. Brenner & J. Gayon (dirs.), French Philosophy of Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer. 2009, vol. 276, 227-253.
  15. Adaptive control loops as an intermediate reduction basis, in A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction and Elimination, München: Ontos Verlag, 2009, 191-219.
  16. My answers to five questions on agency, in Jesús Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions, Automatic Press/VIP
  17. The Representational Basis of Brute Metacognition: A Proposal, in: Lurz, ed., Philosophy of Animal Minds: New Essays on Animal Thought and Consciousness, Cambridge University Press: 2009, 165-183.
  18. (avec E. Pacherie), Neurosciences et compréhension d’autrui, in L. Faucher et P. Poirier (dirs.) Philosophie et neurosciences. Syllepse, 2008, 295-328.
  19. Metacognition in conversation, in  I. Wachmuth & G. Knoblich, (dirs.), Embodied communication,  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008, 329-356. Proust.Embmeta – copie
  20. Agency in schizophrenics from a control theory viewpoint, in W. Prinz & N. Sebanz (eds.), Disorders of volition, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2006, 87-118.
  21. Rationality and metacognition in non-human animals, in S. Hurley & M. Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals ?, Oxford, Oxford University Press., 2006, 247-274.
  22. How voluntary are minimal actions? in S. Maasen, W. Prinz, J. Roth, Voluntary action, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 202-219.
  23. Perceiving intentions, in J. Roessler & N.Eilan (eds.), Agency and self-awareness: issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 296-320.
  24. Action, in B. Smith (ed.), John Searle, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 102-127.
  25. Can radical theories of simulation explain mental concept acquisition? in J. Dokic & J. Proust (eds), Simulation and Knowledge of action, Paris, Ecole Polytechnique, Bibliothèque du CREA, 2000, 387-435 ; traduction roumaine in G.G. Constandache (dir.); Filosofie si stiinte cognitive, Bucarest, Matric Rom, 158-175 version révisée publiée en (2002), in J. Dokic, & J. Proust, (eds.), Simulation and knowledge of action, Amsterdam : John Benjamins, 201-228.
  26. Imitation et agentivité, in J. Nadel & J.Decety, Imiter pour découvrir l’humain, Paris, PUF, 2002, 189-216.
  27. Are empirical arguments acceptable in philosophical analyses of the mind? in U. Moulines et K.G. Niebergall (dirs.), Argument & Analyse, Paderborn, Mentis, 2002, 163-186.
  28. Awareness of Agency: Three Levels of Analysis, (2000), in T. Metzinger (ed.), The Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Cambridge, MIT Press, 307-324.
  29. L’espace, les sens et l’objectivité, in Perception et intermodalité, approches actuelles de la question de Molyneux, (dir. J. Proust ), Paris, PUF, 1997, pp.125-159.
  30. Functionalism and multirealizability: On interaction between structure and function, in Science, Mind and Art, K. Gavroglu, J. Stachel & M. W. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 165, Kluwer, 1995, 169-185.

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